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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
The appellant in this matter is M.R.,1 by and through his guardian, Cynthia F.
Casey. The underlying criminal case that presented the issues M.R. raises on appeal is
State of Utah v. Patrick William Casey.

1

Because M.R. is a juvenile victim of a sexual assault, he will be referred to in
this brief by initials only or as "the victim." We respectfully request that the Court and
the other parties likewise refer to him only by his initials.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction of the Court is one of the issues presented by this appeal. See Part IV,
infra. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court because the Court of Appeals has certified the
case, pursuant to Rule 43(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as a case of
potentially far-reaching importance (R. 325).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
All of the issues presented in this case are legal issues of first impression, which
are subject to de novo review on appeal. See generally State v. Penay 869 P.2d 932, 938
(Utah 1994).
1. Whether the victim of a first degree felony sexual offense was entitled to be
heard before the trial court accepted a plea bargain to a misdemeanor offense under the
Victims' Rights Amendment, Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(b).
2. Whether the district court erred in declining to grant a misplea upon proper
motion by crime victim where the victim's constitutional right to be heard at the plea
hearing was violated and the motion for misplea was made promptly.
3. Whether the district court erred in failing to consider whether the proposed plea
bargain was in the public interest.
4. Whether a crime victim is entitled to appellate review of a trial court's denial of
an attempt to assert a constitutional right.
1

5. Whether a crime victim is entitled to be heard through counsel when attempting
to assert a constitutional right.
All of these issues were properly preserved below, by means of a specific
objection to the district court's rulings on these issues (R. 312-15).
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following relevant provisions are found in Addendum A: Utah Const., art. I, §
28; Utah Const., art. I, § 11; Utah Const., art. VIII, § 5; Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4; Utah
Code Ann. § 77-38-11; Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
On November 3, 1999, the Tooele County Attorney's Office filed a criminal
information charging defendant/appellee Patrick Casey with aggravated sexual abuse of a
child in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(3), a first degree felony charge (R.
004). A preliminary hearing was held in the spring, where the victim, M.R, and his
mother and legal guardian, Cynthia F. Casey, both testified. The case was bound over for
trial, which was set for October 24, 2000.
Following the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor handling the case - Deputy
Tooele County Attorney Alan Jeppesen - met with M.R. and Ms. Casey and told them
that they had made good witnesses (R. 124). A few weeks later, Ms. Casey, along with
her 25-year-old daughter Angela Staples, met with Mr. Jeppesen and explained that the
1

The trial court denied the victim's motion for a misplea without holding an
evidentiary hearing, essentially because the victim had failed to state a claim (R. 327:45).
As a result, all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the victim as the nonmoving party. See Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, \ 2, 20 P.3d 895, 897.
2

defendant had sexually abused three of her other children for almost a decade. She
provided details about defendant Casey's abuse of these other children, explaining that he
was a predatory pedophile (R. 123). At this point, Mr. Jeppesen indicated that, in view of
strong evidence of guilt and defendant Casey's repeated acts of sexual abuse, the case
would not be plea bargained (R. 123).
Shortly before trial, without notice to or discussion with the victim or his family,
Mr. Jeppesen offered to let defendant Casey plead to a Class A misdemeanor. The
victim's family learned of this offer only because Ms. Casey repeatedly called Mr.
Jeppesen about attending the pretrial hearing, finally managing to get through to him (R.
123). When she learned of the offer, Ms. Casey immediately stated her strong opposition.
Mr. Jeppesen indicated that maybe the defendant would not accept the plea (R. 123). The
defendant, however, did accept the plea, a fact that Ms. Casey learned only through
additional, repeated attempts to reach Mr. Jeppesen (R. 123). Ms. Casey again strongly
objected to the plea and explained her desire to urge the court not to accept it (R. 122).
On October 24, 2000, the district court (Judge David Young) held a change of plea
hearing. M.R., Ms. Casey, and other family members attended the hearing. Despite the
victim's clear and repeated objections, the prosecutor did not alert the court to the
victim's objections or his wish to make a statement (R. 122). During a recess in the
hearing, the victim's family again strenuously explained to Mr. Jeppesen their objections
to the plea (R. 122). Mr. Jeppensen responded that crime victims were not his clients,
that he had done the plea, and that it was his decision to make (R. 122). Following the

3

recess, Mr. Jeppesen again refused to inform the court of the victim's desire to speak.
The trial court initially expressed its surprise at the "dramatic change" in the
seriousness of the charges (R. 327:5) and its concern about a stipulated sentence of four
months (R. 327:7-8). After parties agreed to remove the stipulated sentence, the court
accepted the plea and set the matter for sentencing (R. 327:18).
Ms. Casey then immediately sought legal assistance, contacting undersigned
counsel (R. 122). Undersigned counsel agreed to represent the victim on a pro bono basis
and alerted the prosecutor's office to the violation of the victim's rights (R. 136). Mr.
Jeppessen responded with a letter of apology, explaining that: "To be honest, I did not
recall that the victim had right to speak at the hearing where the plea was taken by the
Court.... I will certainly make every effort to so inform the victims of future cases
prosecuted in the Tooele County Attorney's office, and offer my apology to your client"
(R. 127). The letter concluded: "In an effort to accommodate your client, the State and
the Defendant suggest that we move the Court to reopen the hearing so as to allow the
victim's mother an opportunity to address the Court regarding the plea agreement" (R.
127).
Following this suggestion, on November 2, 2000, the victim filed a motion for a
misplea and a motion for the court to reject the plea bargain (R. 140, 142, 152). In
response, Mr. Jeppesen retracted his earlier offer of reopening the hearing and filed a
motion to strike all of the victim's pleadings (R. 283). He argued that he did not
"deliberately and intentionally" deny the victim's right to be heard before the plea was

4

accepted (R. 283). Rather, "it was an oversight on his part that the victim was unable to
address the Court that day" (R. 282). Nonetheless, he opposed the motion for the misplea
(R. 281-83). The defendant likewise objected to reopening the plea (R. 100).
On November 27, 2000, the trial court held a sentencing hearing (R. 328).
Reserving ruling on the defendant's and state's objections that the victim lacked standing
to be heard, the court heard from the victim and his mother, who both objected to the plea
(R. 328:9-18). Counsel for the victim then attempted to present legal arguments in
support of the victim's position (R. 328:18). The court questioned whether the victim
was entitled to have counsel present such arguments (R. 328:18-20), but (without ruling
on the matter) allowed counsel to make a statement (R. 328:20-36). The district court
then stated that it would "informally reopen the plea for the purposes of hearing that
testimony [from the victim and his mother] . . . and the Court will also accept the
testimony certainly now . . . as it has been rendered in respect to sentencing" (R. 328:45
(emphasis added)). The court continued: "The Court finds that the prosecutor should
have, does have, and did in this case, exercise discretion in his negotiations with the
defense attorney. They entered into that agreement with sound legal considerations that
they alone basically negotiated and knew together and on that basis, the Court accepts and
reaffirms the plea on that Class A level and denies any request to the contrary" (R.
328:45).2
At this point, counsel for the victim stood to attempt to note the victim's objection

2

The district court s brief statement is set forth in full in Addendum B.
5

to the court's conclusions. The court refused to hear any objections, stating "I don't wish
to grant you further opportunity to respond" (R. 328:46). Counsel for the victim then
requested an opportunity to provide a later, written proffer of objections. The court
granted this request (R. 328:46), and counsel later filed detailed objections (R. 315).
The court then turned to sentencing. The court heard sentencing arguments from
defense counsel (R. 328:46), Mr. Jeppesen (R. 328:50), and the defendant (R. 328:51).
The court then began to impose sentence. Counsel for the victim, however, interjected to
remind the court of the victim's right to make an impact statement before sentence was
imposed (R. 328:51-52). The court then heard from Ms. Casey (R. 328:52-53) and
sentenced the defendant on the Class A misdemeanor to eight months in jail (R. 328: 54).
On December 6, 2000, the victim filed in the district court a notice of appeal from
the court's ruling (R. 320). The victim thereafter filed a docketing statement in the Court
of Appeals, along with a suggestion of certification to the Supreme Court. The State
concurred with the certification, while the defendant did not. On January 19, 2001, the
Court of Appeals certified this appeal to the Supreme Court, concluding that regardless of
the outcome of the appeal "a petition for writ of certiorari would likely be filed and
granted and resolution of the case has potentially broad-reaching impact" (R. 325).
On December 22, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The
victim filed a response. By order entered February 13, 2001, this Court deferred ruling on
defendant's motion for summary dismissal and directed the parties "to brief their issues

6

for plenary review and to proceed to the next stage in the appellate process."3
SPECIAL RULE REQUIRING THE COURT TO DECIDE ALL
PROPERLY PRESENTED CRIME VICTIMS' ISSUES
As this is the first crime victim's appeal to reach Utah's appellate courts, the Court
should be aware of a special rule governing crime victims appeals. The legislature has
specifically directed that "[a]n appellate court shall review all such properly presented
[crime victims'] issues, including issues that are capable of repetition but would
otherwise evade review." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(c) (emphasis added). The
apparent intent of the legislature was to develop a body of appellate law protecting the
rights of crime victims, recognizing that crime victims appeals would, for practical
reasons, be few and far between. As a result, the Court is obligated to decide all issues
properly presented in this appeal and render a ruling on therr|.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. A victim of a crime has a constitutionally protected right to be heard before any
plea bargain is accepted. Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(b). That right was violated in this
case when the prosecutor refused to bring the victim's strenuous and repeated objections
to the attention of the court.
II. The proper remedy for violation of a victim's right to be heard before
acceptance of a plea bargain is the declaration of a misplea #nd a new plea hearing at

3

One last point may be relevant: On January 16, 2001, Mr. Jeppesen resigned his
prosecuting position, citing unfair "public perceptions" resulting from this case. Mary
Ruth Hammond, Under Fire, Jeppesen Resigns Attorney Post: With Victims in Mind,
Ahlstrom Restructures Office, Tooele County Transcript-Bulletin, Jan. 18, 2001, at 1.
7

which the victim's right is honored. The misplea remedy has been recognized in State v.
Kay, 111 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), where this Court suggested that a plea could be set aside
to protect the "legitimate expectations of . . . the public . . . ." Id. at 1305. As recognized
in Kay and other cases, the prohibition against double jeopardy does not prevent
declaration of a misplea. Nor does the "no benefits for defendants provision" - codified
in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(2) — prevent declaration of a misplea at the request of
the victim. Indeed, were the Court to construe this statute as blocking a misplea, the
statute would be unconstitutional under the Victims' Rights Amendment, Utah Const., art.
I, § 28(l)(a), and the Open Courts Clause, Utah Const., art. I, § 11. The court below erred
in not granting the victim's motion for a misplea.
III. The proper standard for a trial court to apply in determining whether to accept
a proposed plea bargain is whether the plea is in the public interest. This case should be
remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the reduction of the defendant's
charges from a first degree felony to a Class A misdemeanor is in the public interest.
IV. A crime victim can seek appellate review of a violation of his rights. The
right of appeal stems from a specific provision authorizing victim appeals, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b), as well as constitutional guarantees found in the Right to Appeal
Clause, Utah Const., art. VIII, § 5; the Open Courts Clause, Utah Const., art. I, § 11; and
the Crime Victim's Right to Fairness, Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(a).
V. A crime victim has the right to be heard through counsel on legal issues
directly pertaining to victims' rights.

8

ARGUMENT
Since the earliest days of our nation, it has been settled law that "where there is a
legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . . ." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)
(internal quotation omitted). This appeal presents the issue of whether this settled law
applies to crime victims. In this case, the state plainly violated the victim's constitutional
right to be heard before the acceptance of the plea bargain. See Utah Const., art. I, §
28(1 )(b). Yet the state, the defendant, and ultimately the trial judge all took the view that
nothing could be done to remedy that violation. If that view is upheld on appeal, solemn
constitutional commitments made to crime victims will be converted into meaningless
paper promises.
This Court should reverse the trial court and provide an effective remedy for
violations of victims' rights. The appropriate remedy in this case is clear: the Court
should declare a misplea and remand for a new hearing at which the trial court will make
a de novo determination whether to accept the proposed plea between the state and the
defendant after hearing from the victim. That exact remedy would be available to either
the state or the defendant in the event that their substantive rights were violated at a plea
hearing. The constitutional rights of crime victims deserve no less respect.
I.

M.R.'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD BEFORE
APPROVAL OF ANY PLEA BARGAIN WAS VIOLATED.
A.

The Victims' Rights Amendment Guarantees Victims the Right to be
Heard Before Any Plea Is Accepted.

M.R. had a constitutionally protected right to be heard before the district court

9

decided whether to accept the proposed plea bargain between the state and the defendant.
That right is found in the Victims' Rights Amendment, enshrined in our state constitution
in 1994. Among the most important provisions in that amendment is the guarantee that
crime victims have the right "to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related to
the victim . . . ." Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(b). The "important criminal justice hearings"
at which the victim has a right to be heard include "any court proceeding involving the
disposition of charges against a defendant. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(5)(c); § 7738-4(1). Thus, M.R. had the right "to be heard" before the court approved a plea bargain
in which a serious felony charge against the defendant was dismissed. As the drafters of
the Utah provision have noted:
The right to be heard also extends to any proceeding involving a
negotiated plea. Under the present rules of procedure, every agreement
between a defendant and the state to resolve a case before trial must be
submitted to the trial court for approval. If the court believes that the
agreement is not in the interest of justice, the court may reject it.
Unfortunately, victims have not had an opportunity to present their views on
the propriety of plea agreements. Indeed, it may be that keeping the victim
away from the judge is one of the prime motivations for plea bargaining.
Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah's
Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1373, 1394 (internal quotation omitted).4
The right of victims in Utah to be heard before acceptance of a plea parallels the law in

4

Senator Craig A. Peterson and Representative R. Lee Ellertson, the legislative
sponsors of the Victims' Rights Amendment, specifically endorsed this article as "a
statement of the drafters' intention." 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1373 n.*. Accordingly, at
various points in this brief, we will cite this article as evidence of what the drafters of the
Victims' Rights Amendment intended.
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most states. See Douglas E. Beloof, Victims in Criminal Procedure 462 (1999).
While the constitutional amendment by itself is sufficient to establish M.R.'s right
to be heard before a plea was accepted, that right is bolstered in a series of statutes and
other provisions. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3(b), gives victims, "including
children and their guardians," the right "to be informed and assisted as to their role in the
criminal justice process." Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3(c) gives victims the right to "clear
explanations regarding relevant legal proceedings . . . ." These provisions also obligate
the prosecutor, as a "criminal justice agency," to provide the specific "assistance" and
"explanations." To further ensure that victims are treated fairly in the plea bargaining
process, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-601(6), requires the prosecutor,
"at the time of the entry of the plea," to "represent to the court, either in writing or on the
record, that the victim has been contacted and an explanation of the plea has been
provided" before any plea is accepted. As a final guarantee of fair treatment for victims,
the Utah Constitution, art. I, § 28(1 )(a), gives victims the right to be treated with
"fairness, dignity, and respect."
Under all of these provisions, it is quite clear that a victim of a crime enjoys the
right to be heard before the court accepts any plea. In spite of these clear mandates, in the
trial court the Tooele County Attorney's Office ultimately took the contrived position that
the victim has a right to be heard only after the court has accepted the plea (R. 281-82).
This absurd view would render the victim's statement on the plea meaningless —

5

The statutes we have located on this point are collected in Addendum C.
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transforming it from a right important enough to be enshrined in the state constitution to
an irrelevant, after-the-fact commentary on the court's completed decision. The Utah
Constitution explicitly provides that the victim has the right "to be heard at important
criminal justice hearings related to the victim . . . ." Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(b)
(emphasis added). This constitutional right obviously mandates that victims be "heard"
when their statements make a difference — not when their statements are pointless. See
Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 8, 1994 at 9 ("As a result [of
victims speaking], the court will have the benefit of relevant information from the
victim."); Cassell, supra, 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1394 ("no plea agreement should be
accepted without first giving the victim the opportunity to express a view on the
defendant's disposition") (emphasis added).
B. M.R.'s Right to be Heard Was Violated in this Case.
Although M.R. had a constitutionally protected right to be heard before the district
court accepted any plea, he was denied that right. Although M.R., through his guardian,
raised a strenuous objection to the proposed plea with the prosecutor, the prosecutor
declined to bring that information to the attention of the court.6 Moreover, even though
the victim's family was seated in the courtroom during the change of plea hearing, they
were never given the opportunity to address the court. Several days later, the prosecutor
"did not recall" that the victim had that right and offered his "apology" for his failure. (R.

6

In the court below, Mr. Jeppesen claimed that he had informed the court of the
victim's objection (R. 282). Now that the transcript of the October 24 hearing is
available, it is clear that Mr. Jeppesen's representations were simply false.
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127).
The record is thus undisputed that the victim was never heard before the district
court approved the plea. What may be unclear is whether the blame for the lack of an
opportunity to be heard should be assessed to the prosecutor or the district judge.
Certainly the prosecutor could have easily avoided the problem by alerting the judge of
the victim's interest in being heard.7 At the same time, the judge could have simply
inquired whether the victim was present and, if so, whether the victim wished to make a
statement. It is interesting that Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure contains
an elaborate list of inquiries that the court must make of the defendant before any plea is
accepted. See Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11(e)(1) to (e)(8). Yet Rule 11 contains not even a
single inquiry concerning crime victims.8
In light of this uncertainty about the ultimate responsibility for insuring
compliance with victims' rights, the defendant or the state may make the hypertechnical
argument that M.R. was never denied his right to be heard because he could have stood
up in the middle of the plea proceedings to express his views. Such an argument would
7

We have been informed that, in the wake of this case, the Tooele County
Attorney's Office has now adopted an internal policy requiring its prosecutors to inform
the court when a victim wishes to speak.
8
As part of its disposition in this case, we urge this Court to send to its Advisory
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure the mandate to redraft Rule 11 so that an
inquiry concerning compliance with victim's rights becomes part of the Rule 11 plea
process. Trial courts could simply be instructed to inquire of prosecutors whether the
victim had been advised of the proposed plea and whether the victim wished to make a
statement concerning it. We have been informed that many judges throughout Utah
currently follow such a practice. Other states have adopted similar rules. See, e.g., Ind.
Code § 35-35-3-2; Oregon Rev. St. § 135.406; S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-7-9; Texas.
Code Crim. Pro. 26.13.
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never fly in connection with a defendant's right to be heard on the plea bargain. To the
contrary, the trial court must make affirmative inquiries of a defendant before accepting
any plea, see, e.g., State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372-73 (Utah 1996) (trial courts must
personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and
establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional
rights), a requirement with which trial courts must "strictly comply," see, e.g., State v.
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, <f 11, 983 P.2d 556, 558. Moreover, such an argument would
ignore the obvious reality that virtually all crime victims are (as in this case)
unrepresented by legal counsel when the court considers a plea bargain. They thus lack
the legal acumen to insert themselves into a hearing without invitation by the court. The
trial court in this case recognized this reality, noting the victim and his guardian were "not
trained in the law" (R. 328:18). This Court likewise should not blind itself to the reality
that victims of crime do not know the proper procedural devices for asserting their rights.
Victims look to the state - through its prosecutors and judges - to protect their right to be
heard. Mr. Jeppesen was told specifically that the victims wished to make a statement,
and he refused to provide that information to the court. There can be no doubt that, as a
Deputy County Prosecutor, this action constituted state action that deprived the victim of
his right to be heard.9
9

Were the Court to nevertheless reject our argument and hold that M.R. and his
mother somehow forfeited their right to be heard by not jumping up and speaking in the
plea proceeding below, the results could be chaotic. In particular, such a holding would
likely lead to the Utah Council on Crime Victims informing crime victims throughout the
state that they would risk forfeiting their constitutional right to be heard, Utah Const., art.
I, § 28(1 )(b), unless they forcefully injected themselves in the middle of court
14

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE A MISPLEA
TO REMEDY THE VIOLATION OF THE VICTIM'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BE HEARD BEFORE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLEA.
In light of the clear denial of the victim's constitutional right to be heard before the

plea was accepted, the next question that arose below was one of remedy. In the district
court, the defendant and the state took the position that the victim has no remedy for this
violation of his right, even though the violation was discovered and reported to the
prosecutor and defendant within a few days of the court's acceptance of the plea. In their
view, the victim simply had to live with the violation of his rights.
This view would conflict, of course, with the long settled law that "where there is a
legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . .." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)
(internal quotation omitted). This section explains why a "misplea" is the appropriate
remedy when the victim is denied the right to be heard before a plea is accepted.
A.

The Proper Remedy for Violation of a Victim's Right to be Heard
Before Acceptance of a Plea is a Misplea.

The straightforward remedy for a violation of a victim's right to be heard at a plea
hearing is a new plea hearing - in other words, a declaration of a "misplea" that simply
moves the state, the defendant, and the victim back to where they would have been

proceedings. Victims have the right to be heard at, inter alia, bail hearings, plea hearings,
and sentencing hearings. Many victims, unschooled in legal issues, would then begin
vocally attempting to assert themselves in such hearings without invitation from judges or
prosecutors, creating unnecessary tension between courts and victims, burdening the
courts with potentially irrelevant information, and even potentially creating mistrials if
victims improperly spoke in front of juries. Clearly, the better course is for this Court to
conclude that, as a practical matter, M.R. was denied his right to be heard.
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without a violation of victim's rights.10 So straightforward is this remedy that, in its letter
of apology, the Tooele County Attorney's Office initially proposed to "reopen the
hearing" to allow the victim's mother to speak regarding the plea agreement" (R. 127).
Precisely this procedure is recognized in Utah case law. The cases are legion in
which the courts have set aside a plea bargain when defendant's rights are violated. See,
e.g., State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996). But perhaps even more analogous are
cases in which the prosecution has been able to obtain a misplea because of violation of
its right to fair treatment in the plea process. The best illustration of the misplea
procedure is State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986). In Kay, the prosecutor and
defendant agreed to a plea bargain, in which the defendant would be sentenced to life
imprisonment rather than the death penalty. Following the court's acceptance of this deal,
the local community was outraged over the perceived leniency of the plea. See id. at 1297
(noting public demonstrations against the plea). The state then moved to have the plea
vacated, and the trial court agreed. See id. This Court affirmed the trial court's decision
to vacate the plea. Justice Zimmerman's opinion for the Court11 held that a misplea was

10

To be clear, the misplea we proposed would have had the trial court set aside
the prosecution's dismissal of the first degree felony charges, presumably followed by the
defendant's decision to withdraw his guilty plea to a misdemeanor. See Part II.C, infra
(explaining misplea procedure in more detail).
11
Justice Zimmerman's opinion was joined by Justice Durham; Justice Stewart
concurred in the result and joined Parts I and II; Justice Howe concurred in the result and
indicated that he "agree[d] with much of the 'misplea' analysis of the majority." Chief
Justice Hall concurred in the result. Subsequent opinions of Utah appellate courts have
viewed Justice Zimmerman's opinion as stating the law. See, e.g., State v. Moss, 921
P.2d 1021,1024 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App. 4, f 24, 17 P.3d
1145,1151.
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appropriate in various circumstances:
Therefore, it seems plain that a misplea can properly be granted where
obvious reversible error has been committed in connection with the terms or
the acceptance of the plea agreement and no undue prejudice to the
defendant is apparent. Declaration of a misplea also seems reasonable in
situations where some fraud or deception by one party leads to the
acceptance of the plea agreement by the other party or the court. There may
be other circumstances where the balancing of the interests and [the]
legitimate expectations of the defendant and the public will also warrant a
misplea, but we need not reach that question today.
717 P.2d at 1305 (emphasis added). The Court added that "considerations of fundamental
fairness" must govern. Id.
Under these standards, a misplea is the appropriate remedy in this case. We have
no doubt that if the prosecutor or the defendant had been denied an opportunity to be
heard before the plea was accepted, this Court would immediately recognize a misplea.
Crime victim's rights deserve no less respect. As in Kay, considerations of "fundamental
fairness" require the Court to declare a misplea to protect the integrity of those rights. Cf.
Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(a) (crime victims have the right to be treated with "fairness").
In addition to Kay, other Utah cases clearly recognize the appropriateness of a
misplea in situations analogous to this one. For example, State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188
(Utah 1998), held that the trial court acted improperly in accepting, over the prosecution's
objections, a plea to a lesser charge that effectively blocked prosecution for a more
serious charge. The Court of Appeals explained that "[a]n abuse of discretion results
when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors" in accepting a plea. Id. at
1190 (emphasis added). Here, of course, this court did not consider "all legally relevant
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factors" because it did not hear the victim's specific objections before accepting the plea.
Similarly, in State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the trial
judge accepted a plea in abeyance in a case involving sex abuse of a six-year-old girl.
The Attorney General's Office later determined that this plea violated a state statute
forbidding a plea in abeyance in a case involving sex abuse of a young child. The trial
judge thereafter set aside the plea over the defendant's objections. The Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed, explaining that the trial court could declare a misplea "where a trial
court determines sua sponte that 'plain error' exists compelling reversal of the case . . . .
Here, before learning defendant's guilty plea was illegal, the trial judge had already
approved and accepted the plea agreement. The court subsequently learned the
defendant's plea was contrary to law and it therefore [properly] vacated the plea." Id. at
1023-24. In this case, the court's procedure in accepting the plea was also "contrary to
law" — specifically, the constitutional requirement that victims be heard before any plea
is accepted - and there was a plain error in denying the victim's right to be heard.
Accordingly, under Moss, the district court should have "sua sponte" vacated the plea.
B. Double Jeopardy Creates No Barrier to Declaring a Misplea.
In the court below, the parties briefly suggested that the prohibition of double
jeopardy might prevent declaration of a misplea. Their suggestion is misplaced.
Both the federal and state constitutions provide that no person shall "be twice put
in jeopardy" for the same offense. U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const., art. I, § 12. State
v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1302 (Utah 1986), seems to have held that jeopardy attaches once
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a defendant has plead guilty to an offense. Even assuming jeopardy attached when the
defendant pled guilty,12 this fact only "begins, rather than ends [the] inquiry as to whether
double jeopardy bars defendant's retrial." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d at 1025. At least four
Utah appellate cases have allowed a plea to be set aside and a defendant reprosecuted
consistent with double jeopardy principles. The leading case is State v. Kay, 111 P.2d
1294, 1304 (Utah 1986), which held that "by permitting the declaration of a misplea
under appropriate circumstances, the legitimate interest of the public in assuring that
criminal prosecutions are not frustrated by a clumsy application of the double jeopardy
clause is protected." Similarly, State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1996),
concluded that "because manifest necessity justified the trial court's subsequent vacation
of that plea and the defendant was not unduly prejudiced, his rights against double
jeopardy were not implicated." Likewise, State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1191 n.l (Utah
Ct. App. 1998)(internal citation omitted), held that "[notwithstanding the trial court's
12

There are "seemingly conflicting rules in Utah's appellate decisions on this
point" of whether jeopardy attaches at the time of the entry of a guilty plea. State v.
Horrocks, 2001 UT App. 4, <J[ 14, 17 P.3d 1145, 1149. In particular, in apparent contrast
to State v. Kay, both State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101,1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and State
v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150, 1150-51 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), appear to establish the rule that
jeopardy does not attach until a district judge signs an order finally sentencing the
defendant. In an effort to reconcile these possibly conflicting decisions, Horrocks
essentially limited Wright and Curry to situations where a judge had orally entered a
sentencing decision pending receipt of a pre-sentence report. In our view, the Horrocks
distinction between Wright and Curry on the one hand (tentative sentencing decision)
versus Kay on the other (prosecution seeking to set aside plea) is unsatisfactory. It is
possible that Kay was simply wrong on this issue, as there is authority for finding that
jeopardy does not attach until entry of the sentencing order. See, e.g., United States v.
Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616 (1st Cir.1987). The Court here could resolve this point in
our favor by adopting the clear rule that jeopardy does not attach until the imposition of
sentence.
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acceptance of respondent's guilty pleas, respondent should not be entitled to use the
Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent the State from completing its prosecution
on the remaining charges." Finally, the recent case of State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App. 4,
17 P.3d 1145, held that where a defendant had mislead the court, a plea could be set aside
and a trial ordered on the original charges. The court explained that the "defendant was
placed in essentially the same position as he was prior to the misplea." 2001 UT App. 4,
132, 17P.3datll52.
As all these cases make clear, double jeopardy principles do not create a barrier to
declaring a misplea in appropriate circumstances. Instead, trial courts are obligated to
consider the "balancing of interests" and possible unfair prejudice to a defendant in
deciding whether to declare a misplea. In this case, the violation of the victim's
constitutional right to be heard justified - indeed required - a misplea. The balance of
competing interests tips decisively in favor of a misplea. Only a misplea could vindicate
M.R.'s constitutional right to be heard before any plea was accepted. Any other result
would deny him forever that important right. On the other hand, the defendant would in
no way have been prejudiced by the declaration of a misplea. The defendant had no
legitimate interest in the court's acceptance of plea based on less than complete
information. See Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 Wash
U.L.Q. 301, 310-13 (1987) ("the defendant has no right to have the court assess the plea
bargain on less than the total amount of available information"). Nor would the
defendant be unfairly prejudiced in any way. The defendant was alerted to the violation
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of the victim's rights shortly after the plea. The fact that the trial court might have
ultimately rejected the plea is not the kind of unfair prejudice that would entitle him to
object. As Moss explained in upholding a misplea, "to establish undue prejudice a
defendant must show that he or she has taken some affirmative action which would
materially and substantially affect the outcome of a subsequent retrial. Where the
defendant is simply placed in the same position as he or she was prior to the guilty plea,
there is no undue prejudice to the defendant." 921 P.2d at 1026-27.13
The fact that the defendant has since been sentenced and has now served a good
part of his sentence does not change these considerations. M.R. raised proper and timely
objections to the district court's refusal to declare a misplea and has expeditiously
pursued his appellate remedies. In such circumstances, the defendant here can have no
reasonable reliance that his plea will be invulnerable to appellate attack, as held in Kay,
Moss, and the other cases we discuss. Moreover, the victim has statutorily and
constitutionally protected rights to appeal the misplea issue. See Part IV, infra. Allowing
double jeopardy considerations to bar that appeal would either deny victims their
protected right of appeal or potentially result in future cases in the cumbersome
requirement that no sentence could be finally imposed while a victim's appeal was
pending.

13

The misplea analysis might have been different if the victim had waited to
object until the court had already imposed a sentence on the defendant. That issue is not
presented by this appeal.
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C. The Utah Victims' Rights Statutes Authorize a Misplea.
In the court below, the defendant conceded that the prosecutor violated M.R.'s
right to make a statement. The defendant claimed, however, that this violation could not
be remedied. Instead, claimed the defendant, the victim could seek only prospective
injunctive relief - relief for future cases that would, by definition, do nothing for him.
The absurdity of this position is highlighted by contrasting victims' rights with
defendants' rights. Surely no one would claim that a defendant could seek only
prospective relief for a violation of his rights. If a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is violated, for example, we do not expect him to accept the prospective remedy
of getting a lawyer in the next criminal case - he gets in lawyer in that case. Similarly, if
the defendant's rights are violated at a plea hearing, he is entitled to immediate correction
of the problem. See, e.g., State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) (trial court's
failure to comply strictly with rules is good cause defendant's withdrawal of a plea).
The central idea behind the Victim's Rights Amendment was to put victims on
parallel footing with defendants. As explained to the voters when the proposition was on
the ballot, "Currently crime victims do not have the same constitutional rights as criminal
defendants. In fact, they have few rights at all. Proposition 1 will balance the scales of
justice by establishing and protecting victim's rights in Utah's constitution." Utah Voter
Information Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 8, 1994, at 9 (emphasis added). Just as a
defendant's rights are vindicated in on-going proceedings, so too must a victim's be. Any
other conclusion would convert solemn constitutional commitments made to victims into
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mere paper promises - illusory rights that, in practice, give victims nothing.
The victims' rights statutes make clear that victims are entitled to immediate relief
when their rights are violated. The Victim's Rights Act specifically provides that victims
may "bring an action . . . for a writ of mandamus defining or enforcing the rights of
victims under this chapter . . . ." Utah Code. Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(a)(i) (emphases added).
Of course, the action M.R. filed sought to "define" and "enforce" his rights - specifically,
his right to be heard at plea hearings.14 The plain language of the legislation authorized
the trial court to act on the motion to "enforce" the victim's rights.
Bolstering this interpretation is the provision authorizing victim appeals of adverse
"rulings" on their "motions." This statute provides: "Adverse rulings . . . on a motion or
request by a victim of a crime . .. may be appealed under the rules governing appellate
actions . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b). This statute unequivocally recognizes
that the victims will bring "motions" which, if denied, can be appealed. Indeed, the
statute is written in this fashion precisely so that the victims could bring actions in the
middle of court proceedings to vindicate their rights immediately. As the drafters of the
Victims' Rights Amendment explained:
14

Both the state and the defendant suggested at various points in their pleadings
below that the style of the victim's pleading (writ of mandamus, amicus brief, special
action, etc.) might make some difference to the outcome here. Form should not triumph
over substance, particularly where the state courts have yet to provide specific guidance
to crime victims on filing their pleadings. Our motion for a misplea properly presented
the substance of the victim's claims. In the court below, we also sought leave to have our
pleadings construed as complying with any form that the court might find to be
appropriate or, in the alternative, for leave to immediately file in that new form (R. 296).
Thus, our pleadings fully conformed with whatever procedural device might be required
to trigger relief.
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For example, if a court denies a victim her right to be heard at a sentencing
hearing, she can file a motion for a declaratory judgment that she is entitled
to speak. If the judge persists in denying the right to speak, an appeal may
be taken from the adverse ruling under the rules governing appellate
actions.
Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, supra, 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1420. It is
also important to understand that the statute specifically authorizes victims to appeal from
adverse "rulings" on their "motions," instead of requiring them to wait for the "final order
and judgment," which is the conventional prerequisite for an appeal. Compare Utah
Code. Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b) ("Adverse rulings . . . on a motion or request by a victim of
a crime .. . may be appealed under the rules governing appellate actions .. . .") (emphasis
added) with Utah R. App. P. 3 (authorizing appeals from "all final orders and
judgments"). This demonstrates that victims can seek immediate relief in their case.
In support of his claim that victims are remitted to purely prospective relief, the
defendant cited below Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(2), which provides:
This chapter may not be construed as creating a basis for dismissing any
criminal charge or delinquency petition, vacating any adjudication or
conviction, admission or plea of guilty or no contest, or for appellate,
habeas corpus, except in juvenile cases [sic], or other relief from a
judgment in any criminal or delinquency case.
This provision was not designed to block victims from obtaining relief. Instead, its
narrow purpose was to prevent defendants from taking advantage of the Rights of Crime
Victims Act. This intent is readily apparent from the plain language of the provision,
which forbids "dismissing" criminal charges, "vacating" a plea of guilty, or for "other
relief from a judgment in a criminal case - all words that apply to motions brought by
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criminal defendants. For example, the provision prevents a defendant who is unhappy
with a sentence imposed under a plea bargain from trying to escape that sentence under
the guise of protecting a victim's right. As the drafters of the provision have explained:
Under . . . the Rights of Crime Victims Act, defendants have no right
to dismiss pending criminal charges or reverse an otherwise valid criminal
conviction. This limitation is designed to ensure that the enactments are
used only by their beneficiaries — crime victims — not the perpetrators of
criminal offenses,
Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, supra, 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1421 (emphases
added).
The plain language of the provision has no application to a victim who has been
denied the right to be heard on what the victim views as an unduly lenient plea bargain.
Such a victim does not seek to "vacate" a "plea of guilty." Instead, the victim seeks to
reinstate charges - e.g., here the first degree felony charges dismissed by the plea
agreement. It is significant, moreover, that the provision specifically forbids only
vacating a "plea of guilty." Utah's appellate cases clearly recognize a difference between
vacating the defendant's "plea of guilty" and aborting a prosecutor's agreement not to
press charges. For example, the closing sentence in State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1307
(Utah 1986), upholds the trial court's invalidation of the plea agreement (the "misplea"
discussed earlier) and gives defendant Kay an option: "Kay may either withdraw the
guilty pleas that were given as part of the aborted plea agreement and enter new pleas or
he may choose to stand on his guilty pleas and proceed to sentencing
That is precisely the approach the victim suggested here. M.R. raised no challenge
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to defendant Casey's plea of guilty to lewdness involving a child, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5. Instead, the victim challenged the prosecutor's agreement embodied in the plea agreement - not to prosecute Casey for committing aggravated
sexual abuse of a child in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(3), a first degree
felony with different elements found in an entirely separate chapter of the Utah Code. To
be sure, the prosecutor's decision to not pursue the first degree felony led to the
defendant's decision to plead guilty. M.R. does not suggest that defendant Casey would
somehow have been bound to his side of the plea agreement after the prosecution's side is
vacated. But § 77-38-12(2) simply has no application to a victim's effort to insure that a
court makes a plea decision in compliance with victim's rights. Indeed, it would have
been a simple matter for the legislature, if had it so intended, to say that nothing in the
chapter provides grounds for vacating any "plea agreement." In keeping with its
narrower focus, the legislature provided only that nothing in the chapter would provide
grounds for vacating any "plea of guilty."
Section 77-38-12(2) is inapplicable to the present case for other reasons as well.
The provision indicates that nothing in "this chapter may be construed as creating a
basis" for various forms of relief from a criminal judgment. This "chapter," of course,
means chapter 38 of title 77 — the Rights of Crime Victims Act. As explained in Part
LA, supra, M.R.'s right to be heard derived not only from chapter 38, but also from
(among other sources) article I, § 28 of the state constitution and chapter 37 of title 77.
Moreover, M.R. does not contend that the right to declare a misplea was "created" by

26

chapter 38. The misplea procedure was recognized well before the passage of the Rights
of Crime Victims Act in 1994, by pre-existing cases such as State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294
(Utah 1986). This is important because, immediately following the no-benefits-fordefendants provision, the legislature specifically added a protective rule of construction to
carry forward all other pre-existing rights of crime victims: "The enumeration of certain
rights for crime victims in this chapter shall not be construed to deny or disparage other
rights granted by the Utah Constitution or the Legislature or retained by victims of
crimes." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(6).
The foregoing is enough to establish that the no-benefits-for-defendants provision
does not strip a victim of the right to secure relief when his rights have been violated. But
if there were any ambiguity in the provision, it must be resolved in favor of the victim. In
the immediately proceeding provision, the legislature emphatically and unequivocally
declared: "All of the provisions contained in this chapter shall be construed to assist the
victims of crime." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(1) (emphases added). Plainly the
defendant's proposed construction would not "assist" the victims of crime and therefore,
for that reason alone, must be rejected.
D.

Provisions in the Utah Constitution Guarantee Victims the
Opportunity to Seek a Misplea.

The previous section of this brief establishes that the relevant statutes do not block
a crime victim from obtaining a misplea to vindicate his rights. But if, contrary to our
submission, the statutes are somehow construed to block a misplea, they would plainly
violate the Victims' Rights Amendment, Utah Const., art. I, § 28, and the Open Courts
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Clause, Utah Const, art. I, § 11. These potential constitutional violations provide an
additional reason for construing the statutes as we suggest. See Provo City Corp. v. State,
795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990) ("We have a duty to construe statutes to avoid
constitutional conflicts.").
1. The Victims' Rights Amendment.
Interpreting provisions such Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(2) as barring a misplea
would be unconstitutional under the Victims' Rights Amendment. As we have
explained, see Part LA, supra, the Amendment guaranteed M.R. a right "to be heard"
before any plea was accepted. This constitutional right is presumed to be self-executing.
See Spackman ex rel Spackman v. Board ofEduc, 2000 UT 87, f 11, 16 P.3d 533, 536
(citing Utah Const., art. I, § 26 (provisions in the Utah Constitution are "mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise")). Moreover, the
victim's right to be heard "articulates a rule sufficient to give effect to the underlying
rights and duties intended by the framers. In other words,... the framers intended the
provision to have immediate effect and . . . no ancillary legislation is necessary to the
enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed." Id. at f 7, 16 P.3d at
535. Indeed, the drafters of the Victims' Rights Amendment directly indicated their
intention that the Victims' Rights Amendment be self-executing. See Cassell, supra,
1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1387 ("substantive parts of the Victims' Rights Amendment" are
"intended to be self-executing in the sense that state actors are obligated to follow [their]
commends even without further legislative action"). The fact that the legislature also
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enacted the supplementary Rights of Crime Victims Act "does not prevent the provision
from being self-executing." Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996).
A statute cannot subvert the victim's self-executing constitutional right. This
Court has emphasized that "'any rule or regulation in regard to the remedy which does
not, under pretense of modifying or regulating it, take away or impair the right itself,
cannot be regarded as beyond the proper province of legislation.'" Bott v. DeLand, 922
P.2d 732, 736 (Utah 1996) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 756
(1927)).15 In this case, reading the statutes as depriving M.R. of any remedy for violation
of his right, would effectively "take away and impair" his right to be heard and thus was
beyond the "proper province of legislation." In Bott v. DeLand, this Court refused to
apply statutes that it viewed as "an unreasonable regulation of a claimant's constitutional
right. Id. at 736. To construe the statutes here as barring a misplea would go much
further, creating not merely an "unreasonable regulation" of M.R.'s right, but rather a
total abrogation of that right.
Additional constitutional support for this conclusion come from the provision in
the Victims' Rights Amendment guaranteeing crime victims the right "to be treated with
fairness

" Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(a); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(3)

(defining "fairness" as meaning "treating the victim reasonably, even-handedly, and
impartially"). It is simply not treating the crime victim with "fairness" — that is,
15

Botfs holding concerning money damages for a violation of a constitutional
damages must now be read in light of Spackman, 2000 UT 87, \ 20 n.5, 16 P.3d at 537
n.5. This issue is not present here, since the Victims' Rights Amendment by its own
terms precludes the award of money damages. Utah Const., art. I, § 28(2).
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"reasonably" and "even-handedly" — to deny any opportunity for vindicating their rights,
including their right to be heard before a plea is accepted. Criminal defendants, of
course, are guaranteed an opportunity to vindicate their rights; and prosecutors, too, have
been given the chance to obtain a misplea when their interests have not been protected.
See, e.g., State v. Kay, supra; State v. Moss, supra. The fundamental goal of the Victims
Rights' Amendment was to ensure that crime victims received equivalent treatment. See
Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 8, 1994 at 9 ("crime victims do
not have the same constitutional rights as criminal defendants. . . . Proposition 1 will
balance the scales of justice by establishing .. . victims' rights in Utah's Constitution.").
Fairness requires that the rights of crime victims, no less than the rights of other actors in
the criminal justice system, be protected through the right to seek a misplea.
2. The Open Court's Clause.
If the Utah statutes were understood as blocking a misplea, they would also plainly
violate the Open Courts Clause, Utah Const, art. I, § 11, which provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay . . . .
This Court has explained that the Open Courts Clause was designed to guarantee "access
to the courts and [to] a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality." Berry v.
Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). The Clause is not "time-bound," Day v.
State ex reL Dept. of Public Safety, 980 P.2d 1171, 1183 (Utah 1999), but instead protects
new rights like those protected in the victims' rights enactments. See id. Moreover, the
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Open Courts Clause requires "heightened scrutiny" of legislation that impairs remedies
for "an important constitutionally based personal right." Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d
1357, 1365 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Victims' rights are important personal rights now
based in the state constitution. See Utah Const., art. I, § 28.
If Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(2) is interpreted to block any remedy for a victim
whose constitutional right to be heard has plainly been violated, then § 77-38-12(2) would
blatantly run afoul of the Open Courts Clause. Such an interpretation would strip a victim
of any "effective and reasonable" remedy for a violation of the right to be heard. Day v.
State ex rel. Dept. of State, 980 P.2d 1171, 1185 (Utah 1999). Denying any remedy for
violation of a constitutional right is conceivable only where "there is a clear social or
economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id. at 1185 (internal
citation omitted). The legislature has not identified any "clear" evil that blocking a
misplea would eliminate, at least in the narrow circumstances presented by this case. The
only conceivable "evil" might be some modest expenditure of court time in considering
mispleas in those rare cases when a prosecutor violates the victim's rights to be heard.
Such a justification is inadequate for a complete invalidation of a victim's rights. See
Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, f 56, 5 P.3d 616, 632 (Utah 2000) (concluding under Open
Courts Clause that "reducing the cost to government of assuming liability . . . [is] not a
sufficient justification . . . . " for capping damage awards). Moreover, entirely
eliminating any possibility of a misplea — regardless of the egregiousness of the violation
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and the other circumstances that might justify a new hearing — is an arbitrary and
unreasonable means of furthering any end that the legislature might have identified.
Rather than construe state statutes to unconstitutionally impair the right of victims to
obtain any access to the courts, they should be interpreted to allow a misplea.
E. The District Court's Actions Did Not Protect M.R.'s Rights.
The district court's decision not to declare a misplea should be reversed. After the
hearing on the motion for the misplea, the district court never declared a misplea. Rather
the district court said only that it would "informally reopen the plea for the purpose of
hearing that testimony [from M.R. and Ms. Casey] . . . and the Court will also accept the
testimony now . . . as it has been rendered in respect to sentencing" (R. 328:45 (emphases
added). This is obviously not declaring a misplea. Nor does it give the victim's statement
the weight which it was entitled. The victim has a constitutional guarantee to more than
"informal" consideration of his concerns about a plea and that consideration must take
place not after the fact in respect to "sentencing," but at the time of the acceptance or
rejection of the plea. As the district court's statements make clear, the victim did not
receive that protection.
It is not clear why the district court declined to reopen the plea hearing. Perhaps
the district court was concerned about statutory or double jeopardy issues; or perhaps the
district court believed that victim's statements were not entitled to any weight - there is
simply no way to tell. The failure of the district court to make any findings "prevents a
meaningful review of the trial court's ruling." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah
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Ct. App. 1998). Failure to make such findings provides an additional reason for reversal.
For all these reasons, the district court's decision not to reopen the plea hearing
was clear error. It should be reversed and the case remanded for proper consideration of
the victim's objection.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING A PLEA IN THE
ABSENCE OF FINDINGS THAT ITS ACCEPTANCE IS IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST.
On remand, a central issue in this case will be the appropriate standard a district

court should apply in considering plea bargains. In the trial court, both the defendant and
the prosecutor claimed that together they made the "final decision" about any plea bargain
(R. 160,266). Judge Young apparently adopted this position, briefly concluding: 'The
Court finds that the prosecutor should have, does have, and did in this case, exercise
discretion in his negotiations with the defense attorney. They entered into that agreement
with sound legal considerations that they alone basically negotiated and knew together
and on that basis, the Court accepts and reaffirms the plea at the Class A level and denies
any request to the contrary." (R. 328:45 (emphases added)).,
The defendant and the state seriously misapprehended both the plea bargaining
process and the victim's role within it, leading Judge Young to abdicate completely his
judicial responsibility for monitoring pleas. The judicial role is explicitly recognized in
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states directly that "[t]he court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty" (emphasis added). These words mean what they
say. As has been recognized in several appellate decisions, "'nothing in Rule 11(e)
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requires a court to accept a guilty plea.'" State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (quoting State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). In completely
failing to perform that role, Judge Young committed clear error.
The Utah appellate courts have yet to articulate the appropriate standard to be used
by a judge in determining whether to accept or reject a plea. This is a critical issue for
prosecutors, defendants, the public - and crime victims. As the West Virginia Supreme
Court has noted in establishing a standard for evaluating plea bargains, "discretion
without a criterion for its exercise is authorization of arbitrariness." State v. Sears, 542
S.E.2d 863, 867 (W. Va. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).
To avoid arbitrariness, we urge the Court to take this occasion to provide the
standard for evaluating pleas. In articulating a standard, the Court should be aware of
considerable public dissatisfaction with the institution of plea bargaining. Commentators
have recognized the concern that the practice can create "an image of corruption in the
system, or at least an image of a system lacking meaningful purpose and subject to
manipulation by those who are wise to the right tricks." 5 Wayne L. LaFave et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 21.1(f) at 19 (2d. ed. 1999) (internal quotation omitted). To
defendants, victims, and the public alike, "outcomes do not appear to be determined by
principles or careful consideration of persons, but by hustling, conning, manipulating,
bargaining, luck, fortitude, waiting them out, and the like." Albert Alschuler, Book
Review, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev.1007, 1041 (1979) (internal quotation omitted). For these
reasons, at least one national commission and various commentators have proposed
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eliminating plea bargaining. See, e.g., National Advisory Comm'n on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, The Courts § 3.1 (1973); Stephen Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as a
Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979 (1992).; Alschuler, supra.
Against the backdrop of potential problems with plea bargaining, the narrow issue
presented here is what standard trial judges should use to review any deal negotiated by
prosecutors and defense attorneys when a crime victim voices opposition. We submit that
Utah should use a flexible, public interest standard. The public interest standard is used
in many state courts.16 Federal courts have also applied this standard under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is quite similar to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah Court of Appeals
1998) (noting similarity between state and federal rule). The federal cases have held that
"'Rule 11 also contemplates the rejection of a negotiated plea when the district court
believes that bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.'" United States
v. Carrigan, US F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983)). Under this standard, the federal
courts have recognized that "a decision that a plea bargain will result in the defendant's
receiving too light a sentence under the circumstances of the case is a sound reason for a
judge's refusing to accept the agreement." United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th
Cir. 1977). To be sure, operating under this standard, Utah's district court judges would
have considerable discretion in reviewing pleas. See Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462. But

16

We collect the relevant citations in Addendum D.
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recognizing judicial discretion under a broad standard is a far cry from the approach taken
by Judge Young - who simply abdicated any judicial review whatsoever. A trial court's
proper role is not "merely providing the court's 'rubber stamp' for the defendant's plea,
regardless of the level of imposition on the judge's sentencing discretion." People v.
Grove, 566 N.W.2d 547, 555 (Mich. 1997).
The "public interest" standard for reviewing pleas is also consistent with the
Victims' Rights Amendment. As we explained earlier, see Part LA, supra, the Victims'
Rights Amendment gives a crime victim the right to be "heard" before any plea is
accepted. That right would be meaningless if the statement of the victim could not make
a difference to the criminal justice process. Among members of the public, victims'
interests are the most directly affected by the prosecution. As a result, their statements
may frequently provide the court with important information about whether a proposed
plea is unduly lenient or otherwise not in the public interest. Giving weight to their
statements under a public interest standard implements the mandate of the Victims'
Rights Amendment.
Other state courts have recognized that victims' interests are part of public interest
calculation. For example, in State v. Sears, 542 S.E.2d 863 (W. Va. 2000), a trial court
rejected a plea bargain without reviewing the substance of the agreement because it was
offered the day before the trial. The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed, explaining
that a "court's ultimate discretion in accepting or rejecting a plea agreement is whether it
is consistent with the public interest in the fair administration of justice." Id. at 867
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(quoting Myers v. Frailer, 319 S.E.2d 782, 788 (W. Va. 1984)). In administering this
standard, the court instructed that "consideration must be giver* not only to the general
public's perception that crimes should be prosecuted, but to the interests of the victim as
well." 542 S.E.2d at 867 (emphases added). Similarly, in People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d
547 (Mich. 1997), the Michigan Supreme Court found that the trial court acted within its
discretion in rejecting a plea bargain where the victim had requested a prison sentence,
something not contemplated under the proposed plea agreement. The Court explained
that "the judge's reasoning reflected his understanding of the plea agreement, considering
the facts and the interests of the victim, as a substantial hindrance of his ability to impose
an appropriate sentence under the plea bargain . .. ." Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
Once this Court remands this case because of the district court's failure to grant a
misplea, we will establish to the district court that the misdemeanor disposition of the
plea was clearly not in the public interest. In particular, a misdemeanor disposition is not
commensurate with the seriousness of the crimes committed by defendant Casey.
Moreover, the evidence supporting the original first degree felony charges was quite
strong and the prosecutor simply misassessed the strength of his case in dropping it all the
way down to a misdemeanor. These questions, however, are specific factual issues that
should be resolved by the district court in the first instance.17
Before concluding this section of our brief, it is important to emphasize the limits
to our position. In most cases, all of the interested persons - the prosecutor, the
17

In the event that the Court wishes to reach this question, our arguments can be
found in our pleading below urging the plea be rejected (R. 152).
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defendant, and the victim - will agree on the proposed plea bargain. Victims, no less than
prosecutors and defense attorneys can understand the risks of going to trial. This case is a
rare one, in which there was disagreement between the victim and the parties as to the
proper disposition. It is in precisely such cases that the court should carefully examine a
proposed plea and determine whether the public interest supports its acceptance.18
IV.

A CRIME VICTIM IS ENTITLED TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS DENYING VICTIMS' RIGHTS.
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-11(2) Entitles M.R. to Appellate Review of His
Motion for a Misplea.

In the trial court, M.R. filed both a motion for declaration of a misplea (R. 110)
and a motion for the court to reject the plea bargain (R. 142). Under the Utah statutes,
M.R. is plainly entitled to appellate review of the first motion. Because a reversal of the
district court on that motion would send the case back for further review, this Court need
not reach the more complicated issue of whether M.R. would be entitled to appellate
review of his motion challenging the plea bargain.
M.R. is entitled to review of the trial court's decision to decline to reopen the plea
hearing to give him an opportunity to speak. Two provisions of the Utah Code clearly
establish a right of appellate review of the denial of a motion by a crime victim. First, §
77-38-1 l(2)(b) specifically provides: "Adverse rulings on these actions or on a motion or
request brought by a victim of a crime . . . may be appealed under the rules governing
appellate actions . . . . " (emphasis added). Second, § 77-38-1 l(2)(c), specifically
18

When no opposition has been expressed, the trial court would be free, under our
proposal, to assume that a proposed plea is in the public interest.
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provides: "An appellate court shall review all such properly presented issues, including
issues that are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade review" (emphasis added).
Lest there be any doubt about the obvious import of these provisions, their heading in the
Utah Code is "Enforcement — Appellate Review
M.R.'s motion for declaration of a misplea is plainly covered by these provisions.
As we explained above, see Part II.E, supra, Judge Young denied M.R.'s motion for a
misplea by refusing to reopen the plea hearing to give M.R. an opportunity to be heard
with respect to the plea bargain. That was undoubtedly an "adverse ruling" on a "motion"
brought by a victim of crime and thus, under § 77-38-1 l(2)(b), it "may be appealed under
the rules governing appellate actions

" That is precisely the path M.R. has followed.

Although the plain meaning of these provisions leaves no need to resort to
legislative intent, the legislative history fully confirms that the legislature intended to
allow victims to appeal. The primary sponsor of the Rights of Crime Victims Act,
Senator Craig A. Peterson, explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee that: "The
appellate court becomes the court of victims' rights enforcement. Where an issue has
been identified as substantive, the appellate courts would have the oversight authority."
Statutory Provisions on Victims' Rights: Hearings on S.B. 156 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 50th Utah Leg. Gen. Sess. (Feb. 11, 1994) (Sen. recording B)
(emphasis added). Senator Peterson and Representative R. Lee Ellertson have also
explained that when a district court denies a victim the right to speak, "an appeal may be
taken from the adverse ruling under the rules governing appellate actions.... The statute
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authorizes victim appeals from adverse 'rulings' rather than adverse 'final orders and
judgments.' Therefore, victims need not wait for the conclusion of a criminal proceeding
to take an appeal." Cassell, supra, 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1420 & n.235 (law review article
endorsed by Peterson and Ellertson as a statement of their intentions).
Although the relevant statutes directly authorizing this appeal were cited in our
docketing statement, defendant Casey has nonetheless filed a motion to dismiss. (This
Court has deferred ruling on this motion pending full briefing.) The defendant's motion to
dismiss claims that the victim somehow lacks "standing" to enforce his rights under the
Victims' Rights Amendment and the Rights of Crime Victims Act. It is a curious position
that a victim would somehow lack standing to enforce his rights under victims'
enactments. This view subverts the entire thrust of the Victims' Rights Amendment,
which gives victims a constitutionally protected right "to be heard at important criminal
justice hearings related to the victim." Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(b). Implementing this
constitutional right, the Rights of Crime Victims Act specifically provides that a victim
may "bring an action for declaratory relief or for a writ of mandamus defining or
enforcing the rights of victims under this chapter . . . ." Utah Code. Ann. § 77-38ll(2)(a) (emphasis added).
The controlling legal authorities clearly hold that the victim has standing to pursue
this appeal. "[T]he Utah courts have substantial discretionary authority to confer standing
upon appropriate parties because they are not constrained by the case or controversy
requirements contained in the federal constitution . . . . " Olson v. Salt Lake City School
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District, 724 P.2d 960, 962 n.l (Utah 1986). Under this liberal test, the victim has
standing if "any one" of three criteria are met:
(1) the interests of the parties are adverse, and the party seeking relief has a
legally protectible interest in the controversy; (2) no one has a greater
interest than that party and the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if standing
is denied; or (3) the issues raised by the party are of great public importance
and ought to be judicially resolved.
State ex rei M.W., 2000 UT 79, f 12, 12 P.3d 80, 83 (citations omitted).
While the victim here need only satisfy one of these three criteria, the victim in
fact meets all three. First, the victim "has a legally protectible interest in the controversy"
- specifically, a constitutionally protected right to be heard before any plea bargain is
accepted. See Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(b). Protecting that interest is the very reason
for this appeal. Second, it is obvious that no one has a greater interest than the victim in
protecting the victim's right to be heard concerning a plea bargain. The state and the
defendant have also made clear that their interest, if any, in raising this issue is not as
great as the victim's. Third, there appears to be no doubt that the issue of a crime
victim's right to be heard concerning plea bargains is "of great public importance."
Courts have reviewed such important issues even where the party presenting the
claim was not actually a party to the underlying litigation. State ex rei M.W., 2000 Utah
79, 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000), for example, involved a challenge by a father to an order
granting custody of children to their maternal grandmother. Even though the state was
not a party to the trial, the Supreme Court allowed the state to seek further appellate
review of an important issue concerning a presumption in favor of the parent in custody
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proceedings. The "issue upon which the State seeks review," said the Court, "is of great
public importance and should be judicially resolved." Id. at \ 12, 12 P.3d at 83.19 The
issues here are likewise of great public importance and should be judicially resolved.
The foregoing makes clear that M.R. was entitled to take a direct appeal from the
denial of his motion for a misplea, and we ask this Court to so rule. An additional basis
for appeal, however, would be for this Court to construe our pleadings as a petition for
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. The interlocutory order is the district court's denial of the victim's
motion for a misplea. To permit this construction, our notice of appeal lists both this
order and the final judgment as the orders from which we are appealing. We have also
filed our docketing statement within the time period specified in the Rule 5 time limit for
interlocutory appeals - i.e., within 20 days of the district court's denial of our motion for
a misplea.20
There are other cases of similar import. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Utah Solid and
Hazardous Waste Control Board, 964 P.2d 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (allowing Sierra
Club and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation to challenge permit for disposal of
hazardous waste because the "issues in this case clearly qualify as issues of significant
public importance"); National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State
Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 1993) (allowing environmental group to challenge land
transfer based on "possible inimical environmental effects").
20
If for some reason the court were to conclude that an appeal is not the proper
vehicle for a victim to obtain appellate review of a denial of victim's rights in the trial
court, our docketing statement asked this Court to construe our pleadings as a petition for
extraordinary relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65B
authorizes such relief where "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available"
and where an inferior court "has refused the petitioner the .. . enjoyment of a right... to
which the petitioner is entitled." To permit the court to proceed in this fashion if
necessary, we have served all of our pleadings on the putative respondent in such an
action - the Hon. David S. Young, Third District Judge, through the Administrative
42

B. The Utah Constitution Guarantees Crime Victims the Right to Appeal.
The statutes cited in the previous section make clear that a victim is entitled to take
an appeal from an adverse ruling on a motion concerning victim's rights. Not only does
the plain language of the statutes lead to this conclusion, but any other reading would
conflict with at least three provisions of the Utah Constitution, all of which guarantee
crime victims access to the appellate courts.
1. The Right to Appeal Clause.
Utah Constitution, art. VIII, § 5, provides in relevant part that "there shall be in all
cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause" (emphasis added). The right to appeal is a valuable
constitutional right and should not be denied except where it is clear that the right has
been lost or abandoned. See Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947).
As we explained above, the Rights of Crime Victims Act makes clear that the victim was
entitled to file in the district court "an action . . . enforcing the right of victims
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(a)(i). Because a victim's action was proper in the district
court, the Right to Appeal Clause clearly guarantees crime victims an "appeal of right" to
Office of the Courts.
Forcing victims to proceed by way of the cumbersome Rule 65B procedure,
however, would be less desirable than simply recognizing a victim's right to appeal and is
contrary to the legislature's instruction that victims are entitled proceed under the "rules
governing appellate actions," Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b) — that is, under the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure rather than under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governing
"extraordinary" relief. Moreover, forcing victims to proceed under the Rule 65B
procedure might force them to meet a higher standard of proof than, for example, criminal
defendants, contrary to the intentions of the framers of the Victims' Rights Amendments
to insure that the rights oi victims were given equal treatment with those of defendants.
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"a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause."
2. The Open Courts Clause.
As discussed previously, see Part II.D.2, supra, victim's rights are protected by the
Open Courts Clause in the Utah Constitution, Utah Const, art. I, § 11, which provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay . . . .
We will not repeat our previous analysis, but note here that the Clause specifically
indicates that "all courts" shall be open for redress of injury. Any position that a victim
could not vindicate constitutionally-protected rights in the courts — including appellate
courts — would transgress the Open Courts Clause. Such an interpretation would not
only strip a victim of any "effective and reasonable" remedy for a violation of the
constitutional right to be heard. Day v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 980 P.2d
1171, 1185 (Utah 1999). In short, the appellate courts would not be "open" to victims,
contrary to the mandate of the Open Courts Clause.
3. The Crime Victim's Right to Fairness.
As we have discussed above, see Part II.D.l, supra, the Victims' Rights
Amendment guarantees crime victims the right "to be treated with fairness .. . ." Utah
Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(a). The legislature has defined "fairness" as meaning "treating the
victim reasonably, even-handedly, and impartially." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(3).
Crime victims would not be treated with "fairness" — that is, "reasonably" and "evenhandedly" — if they were denied any opportunity for appellate review of claims that their
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constitutionally protected rights were violated. Criminal defendants, of course, have the
right of appellate review to secure their rights. The Victims' Rights Amendment sought
to provide equal treatment to crime victims. See Utah Voter Information Pamphlet,
General Election, Nov. 8, 1994 at 9 ("crime victims do not have the same constitutional
rights as criminal defendants. . . . Proposition 1 will balance the scales of justice by
establishing and protecting victims' rights in Utah's constitution."). Fairness requires that
the rights of crime victims not be remitted to the unreviewable discretion of a single
district court judge, but instead, like the rights of criminal defendants and other litigants,
receive protection from the higher courts.
C. Recognizing a Victim's Right to Appeal Will Not Burden the Courts.
The defendant may argue that recognizing a victim's right to appeal will somehow
overburden the courts. Even were this argument true, it would provide no justification for
denying crime victims access to the appellate courts. The statutes and constitutional
provisions we have discussed clearly mandate a victim's right to appeal. These mandates
leave no room for policy arguments over the desirability of victim appeals.
Were the Court to undertake such a policy analysis, however, it would quickly
discover that the competing interests tip decisively in favor of recognizing a victim's right
to appeal. On the one hand, crime victims' rights are personal rights, sufficiently
important to now be enshrined in the state constitution. At the same time, however, it is
entirely predictable that individual trial court judges will, for whatever reason, from time
to time violate victims' rights. This is not to disparage the capabilities of Utah's
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outstanding corps of district court judges, but simply to recognize the reality that crime
victims' constitutional rights — no less than the rights of criminal defendants or the state
— will occasionally be violated. The Court should be aware that there is in the country
considerable evidence of under-enforcement of crime victims' rights. See, e.g., Nat'l
Inst, of Justice, Research in Brief, The Rights of Crime Victims — Does Legal Protection
make a Difference? 4 exh. 1 (Dec. 1998) (collecting statistical evidence of substantial
underenforcement of victims rights in six randomly selected states); Office for Victims of
Crime, U.S. Dept. of Justice, New Directions from the Field: Victims' Rights and Services
for the 21st Century 29 (1998) ("the consistent implementation and enforcement of
[victims' rights laws] is an area of great concern"). Commentators have speculated on
why victims' rights are so dramatically underenforced. Some attribute the problem to the
"socialization" of lawyers "in a legal culture and structure that do not recognize the
victims as a legitimate party in criminal proceedings." Edna Erez, Victim Participation in
Sentencing: And the Debate Goes On . . . . , 3 Int'l Rev. of Victimology 17, 29 (1994);
accord Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim
Participation Model, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 289. Others blame the lack of a federal
constitutional amendment protecting victims' rights. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell,
Barbarians at the Gates?: A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999
Utah L. Rev. 479, 533-36. The important point for present purposes is that the Court can
hardly be sanguine about how victims' rights are enforced in Utah's trial courts.
Recognizing a victim's right to appeal, moreover, will not burden Utah's appellate
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court system. While a victim's right to appeal has been found in the Utah Code since
1994, this is the first appeal by a crime victim. Victims, of course, frequently lack access
to legal counsel, and thus may find it difficult to file criminal appeals. Cassell, supra,
1999 Utah L. Rev. at 513-14. The victim's right to appeal that we urge in this case is also
limited. Our position is that a victim is entitled to appeal a denial of an attempted
assertion of right — in this case, the denial of the right to speak before a plea was
accepted. The logic of that position would not necessarily require the Court to recognize
a victim's right to appeal a decision by a district court, after properly hearing a victim's
objection, to nonetheless accept a plea bargain. In such case, there would be no "denial"
of a victim's assertion of a right, arguably the necessary trigger for a right to appeal. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b). However, this question of whether a victim has the
right to appeal where the court has accepted a plea bargain after hearing a victim's
objection can be left to another day for a case with adversarial briefing on this point.
V.

A CRIME VICTIM HAS THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD THROUGH
COUNSEL ON LEGAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO A MOTION FOR A
MISPLEA.
One last issue should be decided by this Court. At various points in the

proceedings below, the trial judge expressed skepticism about whether a victim of crime
was entitled to be represented by counsel in attempting to assert his rights. In particular,
when undersigned counsel attempted to present the victim's legal argument in support of
a misplea, Judge Young explained: " . . . I have . . . at least a question in my mind as to the
status that you have to appear here. Historically, I have not had experience with . . .
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attorneys for victims appearing and . . . being heard" (R. 328:6). The judge continued: ". .
.I'm not sure that I see you in any position different than simply a friend of the court. . .
." (R. 328:6). While the judge allowed counsel to make an argument on behalf of the
victim, the judge never ruled on the propriety of counsel being heard. Instead, the trial
judge ultimately concluded only that "the Court has granted . . . considerable leeway in
hearing from Mr. Cassell without making a finding in respect to his having or lack of
having standing in this case" (R. 328:45).
This Court should make clear that victims of crime, no less than criminal
defendants and the state, are entitled to be heard through counsel when their legal rights
are at stake in complex proceedings. Defendants, of course, are entitled to have the
assistance of counsel. As the Supreme Court explained in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963), "reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." The same rationale
applies to victims, as they attempt to assert their rights in a criminal justice system that
has, for too long, failed to recognize their interests. Seey e.g., State v. Lozano, 616 So.2d
73, 78 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) (reprinting trial court order construing Florida right to be
heard as encompassing the right to participation of an attorney under the facts of the
case).21
21

To be clear, we are not arguing that victims are entitled to counsel at state
expense. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-11(3) (no right to "attorneys fees" for violations of
victim's rights). Instead, we contend only that retained or pro bono counsel for victims
should be heard in court proceedings when victims' rights are directly at stake.
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Such a holding would not imply that counsel for victims can participate in, for
example, questioning witnesses during trial proceedings. The drafters of the Victims'
Rights Amendment very carefully crafted their enactment so that it would not interfere
with the conduct of a trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4(2) ('This chapter shall not
confer any right to the victim of a crime to be heard . . . at any criminal trial. . . unless
called as a witness"). We thus raise no challenge to this Court's recent ruling that a courtappointed guardian ad litem was not entitled to ask questions of witnesses in a criminal
trial. See State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, \\ 28-33, 419 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. That very
ruling, however, recognized that a guardian ad litem could properly have a role in
"matters relating specifically to the treatment of the child victim, such as assuring that the
victim received notice and opportunity to be present and heard as mandated by the
victims' rights statutes." Id. at^[ 28 (emphasis added) (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37r-l
to -5, 77-38-1 to -14). It is precisely that role in ensuring an "opportunity to be heard"
that counsel for the victim of crime was entitled to perform in this case.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should declare a misplea and remand this case
to the district court for further proceedings in an opinion concluding:
1. M.R.'s constitutional right to be heard before judicial acceptance of any plea
bargain was violated;
2. M.R. was entitled to a misplea because of the violation of that right;
3. A plea bargain should be accepted only where doing so is in the public interest;
4. Crime victims are entitled to appeal adverse rulings on motions to assert their
rights; and
5. Crime victims are entitled to be heard through counsel when they attempt to
assert their rights.
Respectfully submitted,
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A - RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Const., art. I, § 28 - Declaration of the rights of crime victims.
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, victims of
crimes have these rights, as defined by law:
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from harassment
and abuse throughout the criminal justice process;
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and to be heard at important
criminal justice hearings related to the victim, either in person or through a lawful
representative, once a criminal information or indictment charging a crime has
been publicly filed in court; and
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence, receive and consider, without evidentiary limitation, reliable information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense except that this subsection does not apply to capital cases or situations
involving privileges.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action for
money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief
from any criminal judgment.
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony crimes and such other
crimes or acts, including juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may provide.
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and define this section by
statute.
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 - Courts open - Redress of injuries.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay . . . .
Utah Const., art. VIII, § 5 - Jurisdiction of district court and other courts - Right of
Appeal.
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed
originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the
court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4 - Right to be present and to be heard
(1) The victim of a crime shall have the right to be present at the important
criminal or juvenile justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f),
the right to be heard at the important criminal or juvenile justice hearings provided in
Subsections 77-38-2(5)(b), (c), (d), and (f), and, upon request to the judge hearing the
matter, the right to be present and heard at the initial appearance of the person suspected
of committing the conduct or criminal offense against the victim on issues relating to
whether to release a defendant or minor and, if so, under what conditions release may
occur.
(5) The court shall have the right to limit any victim's statement to matters that are
relevant to the proceeding.

(7) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a victim's right to be heard may be
exercised at the victim's discretion in any appropriate fashion, including an oral, written,
audiotaped, or videotaped statement or direct or indirect information that has been
provided to be included in any presentence report.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-11 Enforcement - Appellate review -No right to money
damages.
(1) If a person acting under color of state law willfully or wantonly fails to perform
duties so that the rights in this chapter are not provided, an action for injunctive relief,
including prospective injunctive relief, may be brought against the individual and the
governmental entity that employs the individual.
(2)
(a) The victim of a crime or representative of a victim of a crime, including
any Victims' Rights Committee as defined in Section 77-37-5 may:
(i) bring an action for declaratory relief or for a writ of mandamus defining
or enforcing the rights of victims and the obligations of government entities
under this chapter; and
(ii) petition to file an amicus brief in any court in any case affecting crime
victims.
(b) Adverse rulings on these actions or on a motion or request brought by a
victim of a crime or a representative of a victim of a crime may be appealed
under the rules governing appellate actions, provided that no appeal shall
constitute grounds for delaying any criminal or juvenile proceeding.
(c) An appellate court shall review all such properly presented issues,
including issues that are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade

review.
(3) The failure to provide the rights in this chapter or Title 77, Chapter 37, Victims
Rights, shall not constitute cause for a judgment against the state or any government
entity, or any individual employed by the state or any government entity, for monetary
damages, attorneys' fees, or the costs of exercising any rights under this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12 Construction of this chapter -No right to set aside
conviction, adjudication, admission, or plea - Severability clause.
(1) All of the provisions contained in this chapter shall be construed to assist the
victims of crime.
(2) This chapter may not be construed as creating a basis for dismissing any
criminal charge or delinquency petition, vacating any adjudication or conviction,
admission or plea of guilty or no contest, or for appellate, habeas corpus, except in
juvenile cases, or other relief from a judgment in any criminal or delinquency case.
(3) This chapter may not be construed as creating any right of a victim to
appointed counsel at state expense.
(4) All of the rights contained in this chapter shall be construed to conform to the
Constitution of the United States.
(5) (a) In the event that any portion of this chapter is found to violate the
Constitution of the United States, the remaining provisions of this chapter shall continue
to operate in full force and effect.
(b) In the event that a particular application of any portion of this chapter is found
to violate the Constitution of the United States, all other applications shall continue to
operate in full force and effect.
(6) The enumeration of certain rights for crime victims in this chapter shall not be
construed to deny or disparage other rights granted by the Utah Constitution or the
Legislature or retained by victims of crimes.

ADDENDUM B - TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENT AT SENTENCING HEARING
Well, the Court has granted considerably - considerable leeway in hearing from
Mr. Cassell without making a finding in respect to his having or lack of having standing
in this case.
The has also heard from the victim and the Court has been informed by the victim
and the victim's representative, i.e., the victim's mother, that the court was not informed
of the desire or request of the victim to be heard at the time the plea was taken. The
Court will informally reopen the plea for the purpose of hearing that testimony, which
I've already heard, and the Court will also accept the testimony certainly now in respect as it has been rendered in respect to sentencing.
The Court finds that the prosecutor should have, does have and did in this case,
exercise discretion in his negotiations with the defense attorney. They entered into that
agreement with sound legal considerations that they alone basically negotiated and knew
together and on that basis, the Court accepts and reaffirms the plea at the Class A level
and denies any request to the contrary.

(R. 328:45)

ADDENDUM C - STATE PROVISIONS ON THE VICTIM'S RIGHT TO BE
HEARD CONCERNING PLEA BARGAINS
The following state provisions give crime victims the right to be heard concerning
plea bargains:
Ariz. Const., art. II, § 2.1(A)(5) ("a victim of crime has a right. . . [t]o be heard at
any proceeding involving . . . a negotiated plea . . .");
Colo. Const., art. II, § 16a ("any person who is a victim of a criminal act, or such
person's .. . legal guardian .. ., shall have the right to be heard when relevant, informed,
and present at all critical stages of the criminal justice process");
Colo. Rev. Stat. 24-4.1-302.5 (victim has the "right to be heard at any court
proceeding that involves . . . the acceptance of a negotiated plea agreement....");
Conn. Const., art. I, § 8(crime victim has "[t]he right to object to or support any
plea agreement entered into by the accused and the prosecution and to make a statement
to the court prior to the acceptance by the court of the plea of guilty or nolo contendere by
the accused");
Fla. Const., art. I, § 16 ("Victims of crime or their lawful representatives . . . are
entitled to the right... to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal
proceedings . . . .");
Ga. Code. Ann. § 17-10-1.1 (2001) ("A victim impact statement submitted by a
victim shall be attached to the case file and may be used by the . . . judge during any stage
of the proceedings against the defendant involving . . . plea bargaining . . . . " ) ;
Idaho Const., art. I, § 22(6) (crime victims have the right "[t]o be heard, upon
request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a plea of guilty . . . .");
Ind. Code. § 35-35-3-2 (before making a recommendation that charge be dropped
as part of plea, the prosecutor must "(1) inform the victim that he has entered into
discussions with defense counsel or the court concerning a recommendation;(2) inform
the victim of the contents of the recommendation before it is filed; and (3) notify the
victim that the victim is entitled to be present and may address the court (in person or in
writing) when the court considers the recommendation");
Maine St. T. 15 § 6101(2) ("Whenever practicable, the attorney for the State shall
make a good faith effort to inform the court about the following: A. If there is a plea
agreement, the victim's or the victim's family's position on the plea agreement");
Minn. Stat. § 611A.037(2) ("The officer conducting a presentence or
predispositional investigation shall make reasonable and good faith efforts to assure that
the victim of that crime is provided with the following information by contacting the
victim or assuring that another public or private agency has contacted the victim: .. . (iv)
the victim's right to object in writing to the court, prior to the time of sentencing or
juvenile court disposition, to the proposed sentence or juvenile dispositional alternative,
or to the terms of the proposed plea agreement");
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-43-33 ("The victim has the right to present an impact

statement or information that concerns the criminal offense or the sentence during any
entry of a plea of guilty, sentencing or restitution proceeding.");
Mo. Cost., art. I, § 32 (crime victims have "the right to be . . . heard at guilty
pleas);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-M:8-k (crime victim has "[t]he right to appear and make
a written or oral victim impact statement. . ., in the case of a plea bargain, prior to any
plea bargain agreement");
N.Y. Exec. Law § 647 ('The court shall consider the views of the victim of a
violent felony offense . . . regarding discretionary decisions relating to the criminal case,
including, but not limited to, plea agreements");
R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-28-4.1 ('Trior to acceptance by the court of a plea
negotiation . . . the victim of the criminal offense shall, upon request, be afforded the
opportunity to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant's criminal
conduct has had upon the victim");
S.C. Const., art. I, § 24(5) (victims of crime have the right to "be heard at any
proceeding involving a . . . plea . . . . " ) ;
S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-7-9 ("The prosecuting attorney shall disclose on the
record any comments on the plea agreement made by the victim, or his designee, of the
defendant's crime to the prosecuting attorney.");
Texas. Code Crim. Pro. 26.13 ("Before accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo
contendere, the court shall inquire as to whether a victim impact statement has been
returned to the attorney representing the state and ask for a copy of the statement if one
has been returned.").1

1

In addition, all states give crime victims the right to be heard at sentencing.
Douglas E. Beloof, Victims in Criminal Procedure 621 (1999). The right to be heard at
sentencing may well include the right to object to a plea. See, e.g., People v. Stringham,
206 Cal.App.3d 184, 198, 253, Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. App. 1988) (victim fully entitled to
"attack a plea bargain" and trial court acted properly in setting aside plea based on that
attack).

ADDENDUM D - STATE PROVISIONS AND DECISIONS ESTABLISHING A
PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD FOR APPROVAL OF PLEAS
The following state provisions and decisions establish a public interest standard for
approval of plea bargains:
People v. Yu, 143 Cal.App.3d 358, 372 (2d Dist. Div.2 1983) (finding trial court
properly exercised discretion to reject plea bargain "which it considers not to be in the
public interest");
Colo. R. Crim. P. 11(f)(5) (2001) (stating that despite existence of "plea agreement
between the district attorney and defense counsel or defendant, the judge in every case
should exercise an independent judgment in deciding whether to grant charge and
sentence concessions");
Blinken v. State, 435 A.2d 86, 91 (Md. 1981) (in reviewing proposed plea, trial
court must determine "whether the agreement is one which punishes the defendant for his
act as well as satisfies the public interest that justice not be thwarted");
Minn. R. Crim. P 15.04 §3 (2) (2000) (stating that trial court "may accept a plea
agreement of the parties when the interest of the public in the effective administration of
justice would thereby be served");
State v. Pew, 590 N.W.2d 319, 324-25 (Minn. 1999) (finding trial court properly
exercised statutory discretion to reject guilty plea in consideration of the public interest
where substantial evidence of defendant's guilt undermined prosecution's argument that
plea was beneficial to avoid possible acquittal at trial);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.432 (1999) (prohibiting trial court from participating in plea
discussions except to inquire of district attorney as to victim's opinion as mandated by §
135.406(b));
State v. Williams, 851 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no abuse of
discretion in trial court's refusal to accept guilty plea where trial court had discretion to
reflect plea upon determination that it was not "helpful in the administration of justice
and . . . in the best interest of the public.");
Cruz v. Texas, 530 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (finding trial court's
refusal to accept plea bargain not abuse of discretion because of trial court's function to
"serve as a check upon . . . bargains [which are] not in the public interest");
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.450(2)(c) (2000) (noting that sometimes plea agreement
where defendant does not fully describe criminal conduct may serve public interest, such
as where victim supports plea agreement); Id. at § 9.94A.090(1) (2000) (requiring trial
court to consider victim's wishes and "interests of justice and . . . the prosecuting
standards" when considering a plea agreement);
State v. Terrill, 625 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Wise. App. 2001) (in considering proposed
plea, trial court should consider "not only the benefit to the public in securing a prompt
disposition of the case, but also the importance of a disposition that furnishes the public
adequate protection and does not depreciate the seriousness of the offense or promote
disrespect for the law").

